How to organise nature production by farmers
运用委托代理理论分析农民与政府签订自然生产合同时面临的不确定性和信息不对称问题，提出参与奖金可激励农民真实披露成本，实现纳什均衡。
When farmers contract to produce ‘nature’, they act as agents to the governments principal. Principal-agent theory provides a comprehensive analytical framework for studying this relationship. The principal and agent must cope with uncertainty and asymmetrical and imperfect information, and therefore transactions may take place under adverse selection and moral hazard. The farmers' uncertainty relates to the contract and the government's inconsistency over time. Also important is their attitude to risk. A participation bonus can motivate farmers to reveal their real costs. Truth-telling creates a Nash equilibrium. Farmers can anticipate the uncertainties of government time inconsistencies by adopting a more risk-averse position.