USING LOTTERIES TO FINANCE PUBLIC GOODS: THEORY AND EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE*
研究慈善募捐的经济学，通过理论分析和实验检验，发现单奖和多奖彩票在募捐总额和参与人数上均优于自愿捐款机制，且最优机制取决于捐赠者的风险态度和偏好异质性。
This study explores the economics of charitable fund‐raising. We begin by developing theory that examines the optimal lottery design while explicitly relaxing both risk‐neutrality and preference homogeneity assumptions. We test our theory using a battery of experimental treatments and find that our theoretical predictions are largely confirmed. Specifically, we find that single‐ and multiple‐prize lotteries dominate the voluntary contribution mechanism both in total dollars raised and the number of contributors attracted. Moreover, we find that the optimal fund‐raising mechanism depends critically on the risk postures of potential contributors and preference heterogeneity.