Sampling best response dynamics and deterministic equilibrium selection
研究了博弈演化中，修订者观察随机数量对手的随机样本后选择最优反应的动态模型，给出了迭代p-占优均衡几乎全局渐近稳定的条件，并证明在超模博弈中稳定状态必为迭代p-占优均衡。
We consider a model of evolution in games in which a revising agent observes the actions of a random number of randomly sampled opponents and then chooses a best response to the distribution of actions in the sample. We provide a condition on the distribution of sample sizes under which an iterated $p$-dominant equilibrium is almost globally asymptotically stable under these dynamics. We show under an additional condition on the sample size distribution that in supermodular games, an almost globally asymptotically stable state must be an iterated $p$-dominant equilibrium. Since our selection results are for deterministic dynamics, any selected equilibrium is reached quickly; the long waiting times associated with equilibrium selection in stochastic stability models are absent.