Transparency and distressed sales under asymmetric information
研究了在信息不对称和相互依赖价值的动态市场中，公开报价与私下报价对交易量的影响，发现私下报价能促进更多交易并避免市场崩溃，对理解市场透明度的作用有参考价值。
We analyze price transparency in a dynamic market with private information and interdependent values. Uninformed buyers compete inter- and intra-temporarily for a good sold by an informed seller suffering a liquidity shock. We contrast public versus private price offers. With two opportunities to trade, all equilibria with private offers have more trade than any equilibrium with public offers; under some additional conditions, we show Pareto-dominance of the private-offers equilibria. If a failure to trade by the deadline results in an efficiency loss, public offers can induce a market breakdown before the deadline, while trade never stops with private offers.