The Political Economy of Trade Policy
梳理了分析贸易政策政治经济学的两种主流框架：一种强调政治参与者的经济自利，另一种关注选民和官员的社会关切，并探讨如何整合二者以解释保护主义现象。
International trade seems to be a subject where the advice of economists is routinely disregarded. Economists are nearly unanimous in their general opposition to protectionism, but the increase in U.S. protection in recent years in such sectors as automobiles, steel, textiles and apparel, machine tools, footwear and semiconductors demonstrates that economists lack political influence on trade policy. Two broad approaches have been developed to analyze the political economics of trade policy and the processes that generate protectionism. One approach emphasizes the economic self-interest of the political participants, while the other stresses the importance of the broad social concerns of voters and public officials. This paper outlines the nature of the two approaches, indicating how they can explain the above anomalies and other trade policy behavior, and concludes with observations about integrating the two frameworks, conducting further research, and making policy based on the analysis.