Incentives to Inflate Reported Cash from Operations Using Classification and Timing
研究企业何时及如何通过分类和时机选择夸大现金流量表中的经营现金流，发现财务困境、信用评级接近投资级边界、分析师现金流预测以及股票回报与经营现金流关联度高等因素会激励这种行为。
ABSTRACT This study examines when firms inflate reported cash from operations in the statement of cash flows (CFO) and the mechanisms through which firms manage CFO. CFO management is distinct from earnings management. Unlike the manipulation of accruals, firms cannot manage CFO with biased estimates, but must resort to classification and timing. I identify four firm characteristics associated with incentives to inflate reported CFO: (1) financial distress, (2) a long-term credit rating near the investment/non-investment grade cutoff, (3) the existence of analyst cash flow forecasts, and (4) higher associations between stock returns and CFO. Results indicate that, even after controlling for the level of earnings, firms upward manage reported CFO when the incentives to do so are particularly high. Specifically, firms manage CFO by shifting items between th estatement of cash flows categories both within and outside the boundaries of generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), and by timing certain transactions such as delaying payments to suppliers or accelerating collections from customers. Data Availability: Data are available from public sources identified in the study.