The problem of unobservables in strategic management research
探讨代理理论、交易成本理论和资源基础观等战略管理核心理论中不可观测变量的问题，评述实证主义与现实主义之争，主张采取现实主义立场并指出其对战略管理研究的启示。
Abstract In this paper we argue that unobservable constructs lie at the core of a number of influential theories used in the strategic management literature—including agency theory, transaction cost theory, and the resource‐based view of the firm. The debate over how best to deal with the problem of unobservables has raged in the philosophy of science literature for the best part of the current century. On the one hand, there are the positivists, who believe that theories containing unobservable constructs are only useful as tools for making predictions. According to positivists, such theories do not inform us about the deep structure of reality. On the other hand, there are the realists, who believe that our theories can give us knowledge about unobservables. Herein we review this debate, we argue for adopting a realist position, and we draw out the implications for strategic management research.