Insider Trading and Earnings Management
分析内幕交易与盈余管理的关系，发现内幕人士在买入时调低盈余、卖出时调高盈余，且价值型公司比成长型公司更倾向于调高盈余，支持信号假说和机会主义假说。
Abstract: This paper analyzes the relationship between earnings management and insider trading, specifically investigating whether discretionary accruals are related to insider trading and valuation. We find strong evidence of insiders managing earnings downward when buying and managing earnings upward when selling. On the marginal basis, value (high book‐to‐market value) firms manage their earnings upward compared to growth (low book‐to‐market value) firms, consistent with a signaling hypothesis. However, the opposite is true on the average basis, consistent with an opportunistic hypothesis.