Centralized and Decentralized Contracts in a Moral Hazard Environment
研究了在道德风险环境下，委托人是集中还是分散签订合同更优，并将结论应用于企业特许经营决策，发现距离总部远、孤立且风险低的门店更可能采用特许经营。
We study the optimal allocation of the contracting capacity in a moral hazard environment. Centralizing is superior when the principal is able to establish all the contracts with the agents simultaneously and she is able to monitor side contracting between the agents. Otherwise, decentralizing can be a superior strategy. We apply our results to a firm’s decision on which outlets to franchise. They suggest that franchising is more likely to occur the further the store is from headquarters, the more isolated it is and in those activities where the risk is low. This conclusion is consistent with empirical studies.