The effects of leveraged buyouts on corporate growth and diversification in large firms
研究了1980年代美国大型企业杠杆收购后，发现收购企业收入和员工增长显著低于未收购企业，且更大幅度缩减核心与边缘业务，支持杠杆收购激励管理者精简业务、降低规模和多元化的观点。
Abstract This study investigates the effects of LBOs on corporate growth and diversification in large U.S. firms which underwent leveraged buyouts during the 1980s. Based on the analysis, this study found that revenue and employee growth are significantly lower in LBO firms than in control firms that remained public. Strategically, we find that LBO firms decreased the size of both their periphery and core businesses more than public control firms and that LBO firms divested a significantly higher volume of periphery and core businesses than control firms. These postbuyout differences between LBO and public firms are consistent with the argument that LBO firms provide managers with incentives to downsize and prune lines of business, resulting in reduction in overall firm size and diversifcation.