The Access Pricing Problem with Deregulation: A Note
扩展了Armstrong等人1996年的分析，研究零售价格放松管制下的最优接入定价，发现最优接入价格可能高于、低于或等于边际成本，且管制接入价格水平比管制零售价与接入价之间的差额更能提高福利和进入者利润。
This note extends the analysis of Armstrong, Doyle and Vickers [1996] to the case of retail price deregulation. It is shown (i) that the optimal access price may be above, below, or (in the linear case) equal to marginal cost, (ii) that optimal regulation of the margin between the retail price and the access price entails the ECPR, and (iii) that welfare and entrant profit are higher when the level of the access price, rather than the margin, is regulated.