The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target
研究任命一个比社会更重视通胀稳定的央行行长如何降低通胀率，但会增大就业波动，并利用包络定理找到最优权重，为选择中间货币目标提供新框架。
Society can sometimes make itself better off by appointing a central banker who does not share the social objective function, but instead places "too large" a weight on inflation-rate stabilization relative to employment stabilization. Although having such an agent head the central bank reduces the time-consistent rate of inflation, it suboptimally raises the variance of employment when supply shocks are large. Using an envelope theorem, we show that the ideal agent places a large, but finite, weight on inflation. The analysis also provides a new framework for choosing among alternative intermediate monetary targets.