The Mirrlees Approach to Mechanism Design with Renegotiation (with Applications to Hold-up and Risk Sharing)
发展了Maskin和Moore（1999）分析的实施问题的一阶方法，刻画可执行的效用映射集合，并应用于敲竹杠和风险分担模型中的最优契约设计，考察何时可以限制使用简单契约。
The paper studies the implementation problem, first analyzed by Maskin and Moore (1999), in which two agents observe an unverifiable state of nature and may renegotiate inefficient outcomes following play of the mechanism. We develop a first-order approach to characterizing the set of implementable utility mappings in this problem, paralleling Mirrlees's (1971) first-order analysis of standard mechanism design problems. We use this characterization to study optimal contracting in hold-up and risk-sharing models. In particular, we examine when the contracting parties can optimally restrict attention to simple contracts, such as noncontingent contracts and option contracts (where only one agent sends a message).