Accumulation by Decarbonization and the Governance of Carbon Offsets
研究了国际碳抵消的治理，分析《京都议定书》清洁发展机制与自愿碳抵消在监管和链条复杂性上的差异，揭示碳抵消如何成为资本积累策略，将大气治理权力下放给超国家、非国家行为体和市场。
Abstract This article examines the governance of international carbon offsets, analyzing the political economy of the origins and governance of offsets. We examine how the governance structures of the Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism and unregulated voluntary carbon offsets differ in regulation and in complexity of the chain that links consumers and reducers of carbon, with specific consequences for carbon reductions, development, and the ability to provide “accumulation by decarbonization.” We show how carbon offsets represent capital‐accumulation strategies that devolve governance over the atmosphere to supranational and nonstate actors and to the market.