Contracting with Diversely Naive Agents
委托人面对对未来品味变化预测能力不同的代理人，代理人相信未来偏好与当前相同的概率θ是其私人类型，委托人需设计合同菜单来甄别代理人类型，并刻画了最优菜单的特征。
A principal contracts with agents who have diverse abilities to forecast changes in their future tastes. While the principal knows that the agent’s tastes are changing, the agent believes that with probability θ, his future preferences will be identical to his present preferences. The principal does not observe θ, but he knows the probability distribution from which it is drawn. Thus, the agent’s prior probability θ is his “private type”, and the principal has to offer a menu of contracts in order to screen the agent’s type. We provide a full characterization of the principal’s optimal menu. The results allow us to interpret some real-life contractual arrangements in a variety of examples. 1