ON EQUILIBRIUM FOR OVERLAPPING GENERATIONS ORGANIZATIONS*
指出经典代际交叠模型中的均衡概念未满足理性信念与个体最大化条件，提出组织均衡概念，证明其存在性、唯一性且优于自给自足但非最优，可通过求解最大化问题得到。
Necessary conditions for equilibrium are that beliefs about the behavior of other agents are rational and individuals maximize. We argue that in stationary OLG environments this implies that any future generation in the same situation as the initial generation must do as well as the initial generation did in that situation. We conclude that the existing equilibrium concepts in the literature do not satisfy this condition. We then propose an alternative equilibrium concept, organizational equilibrium that satisfies this condition. We show that equilibrium exists, it is unique, and it improves over autarky without achieving optimality. Moreover, the equilibrium can be readily found by solving a maximization program.