Mixed Motives and the Optimal Size of Voting Bodies
研究了在孔多塞陪审团模型中，当投票者同时受工具性动机和表达性动机驱动时，投票机构规模对决策准确性的影响。发现即使很小的表达性动机也会显著改变均衡行为和最优规模，扩大规模反而可能降低准确性，除非两种动机冲突很小，否则大规模投票机构的表现不比抛硬币更好。
We study a Condorcet jury model where voters are driven by instrumental and expressive motives. We show that arbitrarily small amounts of expressive motives significantly affect equilibrium behavior and the optimal size of voting bodies. Enlarging voting bodies always reduces accuracy over some region. Unless conflict between expressive and instrumental preferences is very low, information does not aggregate in the limit, and large voting bodies perform no better than a coin flip in selecting the correct outcome. Thus, even when adding informed voters is costless, smaller voting bodies often produce better decisions.