Government Insurance Program Design, Incentive Effects, and Technology Adoption: The Case of Skip‐Row Crop Insurance
研究了政府保险设计不当是否会影响技术采用决策，以跳行种植为例，发现保险规则扭曲激励，抑制了该技术的采用。
Can the availability of poorly‐designed government insurance alter technology adoption decisions? A theoretical model of technology adoption and insurance incentive effects for a high‐ and low‐risk technology is developed and explored empirically using a unique dataset of skip‐row agronomic trial data. A multivariate nonparametric resampling technique is developed, which augments the trial data with a larger dataset of conventional yields to improve estimation efficiency. Skip‐row adoption is found to increase mean yields and reduce risk in areas prone to drought. RMA insurance rules have incentive‐distorting impacts which disincentivize skip‐row adoption.