Temporary Controls on Capital Inflows
研究不对称且临时性的资本流入管制政策，校准其潜在效果，评估福利影响，并分析延迟取消管制的福利成本。
During the past decade a number of countries imposed capital controls that had two distinguishing features: they were asymmetric, in that they were designed principally to\ndiscourage capital inflows, and they were temporary. This paper studies formally the consequences of these policies, calibrates their potential effectiveness, and assesses their\nwelfare implications in an environment in which the level of capital inflows can be suboptimal. In addition, motivated by the fact that these types of controls have often been left in place after the dissipation of the shock that lead to the controls being implemented, the paper evaluates the welfare cost of procrastination in removing these types of controls.