Imperfect Competition in Auction Designs
研究两个拥有相同商品的卖家，通过设置保留价进行第二价格密封拍卖竞争，发现所有均衡都无效率，保留价不会降至成本，并讨论垄断最优拍卖与寡头垄断的差异。
We study the competition between two owners of identical goods who wish to sell them to a pool of potential buyers. The sellers compete simultaneously setting reserve prices for their second price sealed bid auctions. Upon observing the set reserve prices, the buyers decide simultaneously in which auction to bid. We show that this game has (at least) one equilibrium and that all equilibria are inefficient: reserve prices are not driven to zero (cost). We also discuss where and why the parallel between optimal auction design and optimal pricing in the case of monopoly breaks down for oligopoly.