Financial Advisors and Shareholder Wealth Gains in Corporate Takeovers
研究并购中财务顾问声誉对股东财富的影响，发现收购方顾问相对声誉越高，收购方获得的财富份额越大，目标方越小；双方顾问声誉越高，总财富越大。
We examine the effect of financial advisor reputation on wealth gains in corporate takeovers. In view of the adversarial nature of a takeover, we construct a measure of the relative reputation of the advisor. We document that the absolute wealth gain as well as the share of the total takeover wealth gain accruing to the bidder (target) increases (decreases) as the reputation of the bidder's advisor increases relative to that of the target. We also find that the total wealth created in the takeover is positively related to the reputation of bidder and target advisors. While bidder advisor reputation is positively related to the probability of bid success in our sample, we also present some evidence to suggest that bidders with better advisors are more likely to withdraw from potentially value-destroying takeovers.