Markets with Multidimensional Private Information
研究了卖方在偏好和资产质量上拥有私人信息时的价格形成，发现存在多种均衡，包括半分离均衡，且该均衡可能非帕累托最优，有效配置需要买方间转移支付。
This paper explores price formation when sellers are privately informed about their preferences and the quality of their asset. There are many equilibria, including a semi-separating one in which each seller's price depends on a one-dimensional index of her preferences and asset quality. This multiplicity does not rely on off-the-equilibrium path beliefs and so is not amenable to standard signaling game refinements. The semi-separating equilibrium may not be Pareto efficient, even if it is not Pareto dominated by any other equilibrium. Instead, efficient allocations may require transfers across uninformed buyers, inconsistent with any equilibrium.