Foreign Direct Investment and the Political Economy of Protection
指出进口竞争行业可能不追求最高保护，因为高保护会吸引外国直接投资，反而不如进口竞争。政府被国内行业俘获后，会设定较低保护水平以限制外资进入，并偏好自愿出口限制这种保护形式。
This paper makes the point that an import‐competing industry may not want maximal protection. The reason is that a high level of protection encourages inward foreign direct investment, which could be even less desirable than import competition. A government captured by the domestic import‐competing industry consequently will set the level of protection low enough to limit direct foreign entry. This paper also establishes results regarding the form of protection. Voluntary export restraints are shown to be the domestic industry's desired means of protection, because leaving export rents with foreigners inhibits foreign direct investment.