Estimating the Market for Tomatoes
建立了一个以色列西红柿市场的计量模型，分析营销委员会和中间商造成的扭曲，实证发现批发商在市场上拥有强大的买方垄断力和较弱的卖方垄断力。
Abstract An econometric model of the market for tomatoes in Israel is developed to take into account the distortions brought about by the marketing board and intermediaries. The existence of monopoly and monopsony power is hypothesized by analyzing the middlemen's optimal behavior. Being compelled by the marketing board to purchase all produce, wholesalers exert monopsony power by reducing quantities marketed to consumers by selling surpluses to the marketing board at the minimum price. The empirical results confirm the existence of strong monopsony power together with weak monopoly power in that market.