An Application of the Shapley Value to Fair Division with Money
研究在允许货币补偿且效用为准线性时，如何公平分配。作者提出四个公理，发现当商品具有足够替代性时，夏普利值能满足所有公理，例如每个代理人只消费一种商品的不可分物品最优分配问题。
The author considers fair division when monetary compensations are feasible and utilities are quasi-linear. Four axioms are discussed: individual rationality, resource monotonicity, population solidarity, and the stand alone test. The latter views the utility from consuming all the goods as an upper bound on every coalition's actual (joint) utility. Under efficiency, the four axioms show little compatibility. However, when the goods have enough substitutability in everyone's preferences, the Shapley value of the surplus sharing game satisfies all four axioms. An example is the optimal assignment of indivisible goods when every agent consumes only one good. Copyright 1992 by The Econometric Society.