Auditors’ Liability, Investments, and Capital Markets: A Potential Unintended Consequence of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act
研究了萨班斯-奥克斯利法案加强审计师责任后，对审计失败率、资本成本和新投资水平的影响，发现虽然降低了审计失败率和资本成本，但也减少了新的盈利投资。
ABSTRACT To restore investors’ confidence in the reliability of corporate financial disclosures, the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002 mandated stricter regulations and arguably increased auditors’ liability. In this paper, we analyze the effects of increased auditor liability on the audit failure rate, the cost of capital, and the level of new investment. We focus on a setting in which, with imperfect auditing, a firm has better information than investors about its prospects and seeks to raise capital for new investments in a lemons market. The equilibrium analysis derives corporate reporting and investing choices by the firm, attestation opinions by the auditor, and valuation by rational investors. Three empirically testable predictions emerge: although increasing auditor liability decreases the audit failure rate and the cost of capital for new projects, it also decreases the level of new profitable investments.