Learning and Noisy Equilibrium Behavior in an Experimental Study of Imperfect Price Competition*
通过双寡头定价实验，发现高价格企业的市场份额与价格正相关，并用logit均衡模型准确预测了最终期平均价格，同时用简单学习模型解释了价格时间路径的差异。
We consider a duopoly pricing game with a unique Bertrand–Nashequilibrium. The high‐price firm has a nonvanishing market share, however, and intuition suggests that observed prices may be positively related to this market share. This relationship is implied by a model in which players make noisy (logit) best responses to expected payoff differences. The resulting logit equilibrium model was used to design an experiment in which the high‐price firm's market share varies. The model accurately predicts the final‐period price averages. A naive learning model predicts the observed differences in the time paths of average prices.