Repeated Games with Long-Run and Short-Run Players
研究长期和短期参与者在低折现率下的重复博弈均衡收益集合，发现短期参与者的静态反应曲线约束了均衡结果，且混合策略可观察时民间定理成立，但仅观察行动时均衡集不同。
This paper studies the set of equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with long- and short-run players and little discounting. Because the short-run players are unconcerned about the future, each equilibrium outcome is constrained to lie on their static reaction (best-response) curves. The natural extension of the folk theorem to games of this sort would simply include this constraint in the definitions of the feasible payoffs and minmax values. In fact, this extension does obtain under the assumption that each player's choice of a <i>mixed</i> strategy for the stage game is publicly observable but, in contrast to standard repeated games, the set of equilibrium payoffs is different if players can observe only their opponents' realized actions.