Transparency Reforms in the Public Sector: Beyond the New Economics of Organization
通过对墨西哥16个联邦机构的实证研究，挑战新组织经济学关于公共部门透明度的观点，发现组织内部存在超越法律要求的透明度内化动态，并指出该理论的内在矛盾影响改革设计。
This article challenges the arguments of the new economics of organization (NEO) on the phenomenon of transparency in the public sector. This is achieved by conducting an empirical study of 16 federal agencies in Mexico, which analyzes the implementation of the federal transparency law. Our findings indicate that some organizations are developing internal dynamics well beyond those anticipated by the law, while others are just complying with the minimum legal requirements. We suggest that there is a dynamic of transparency ‘internalization’ in these organizations that the NEO has been neglecting, and also a basic contradiction in the construction of the NEO theory, which affects the design and implementation of transparency laws. Solving this problem would demand a change of the underlying paradigm that sustains transparency reforms. Instead of taking opportunism, selfishness, and a profound distrust attitude toward public servants as departure points, effective transparency reforms require trustworthy public officials in order to endorse and implement successful organizational transformations that foster public openness and transparency.