Strange Bids: Bidding Behaviour in the United Kingdom's Third Generation Spectrum Auction
研究2000年英国第三代移动电话频谱拍卖中多家公司的出价行为，发现其偏离了私有价值下的简单出价模式，尤其对大牌照的估值在拍卖中剧烈变化，表明频谱拍卖的运作机制尚不清晰。
This article studies bidding behaviour in the auction of radio spectrum for third generation mobile telephone services which took place in the UK in the Spring of 2000. We show that several companies' bidding behaviour deviates strongly from straightforward bidding with private values. In particular some companies' evaluation of the added advantage of having a large licence rather than a small licence seemed to change dramatically during the auction. No compelling explanation of this phenomenon seems available at this stage. We conclude that it is less well understood than previously believed how spectrum auctions work.