Strategic Complementarity, Stabilization Policy, and the Optimal Degree of Publicity
研究了在信息异质且存在战略互补性的模型中，稳定政策如何影响信息公开的福利效应，发现最优政策下零透明度能最大化福利。
This paper examines the welfare implications of public information dissemination within a model in which information is heterogeneous across agents and where a strategic complementarity is present. The focus of the analysis is on how the presence of stabilization policy affects the case for transparency. In considering this issue, it extends James and Lawler's (2011) contribution by incorporating an alternative payoff function and by employing a different representation of public disclosure. The study's key finding is that the conclusions drawn in its precursor are robust to these modifications; specifically, in the presence of optimally designed policy intervention zero transparency maximizes welfare.