On the Optimality of Clickthrough Fees in Online Markets
研究垄断在线平台在连接广告主与潜在买家时，如何最优地设定费用，发现仅使用点击通过费能最大化利润，为在线广告市场纯点击收费实践提供理论依据。
We study optimal fee setting decisions by a monopoly online platform connecting advertisers with potential buyers in two environments: a simple model that captures stylised features of advertising on search engines, social networks and advertisement‐supported email; and a richer model that is more relevant for 'directed' search at price comparison sites. While the platform can choose to charge for both impressions and clicks, we show that the platform maximises profits by using clickthrough fees exclusively. Our model offers a rationale for the evolving practice of relying purely on clickthrough fees for revenues in many online advertising markets.