Perfect Equilibrium in a Model of a Race
研究两人争夺不可分奖品的竞赛模型中的完美均衡，发现获胜者行为常如同无对手，竞争仅在初期有影响，并分析决定胜负的因素，对专利竞赛有启示。
This paper investigates perfect equilibrium in a model of a race in which two players are competing for an indivisible prize. The winner is the first player to reach the finishing line. It is shown that the behaviour of the winner of the race is often exactly as if he were the only player: the rival makes no difference. Even if competition does affect the winner's behaviour, it does so only in the first stage of the race and not thereafter. It is shown how several factors combine to determine which player will win: relative valuations of the prize, discount rates, efficiency at making progress and initial distances from the finishing line. Insofar as the model applies to patent races, it suggests that the potential competition faced by one firm in a patent race (e.g. an incumbent monopolist) may be of little or no consequence.