SOFT MONEY AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM
研究了在政治捐款有上限但存在软钱漏洞时，特殊利益集团对政策的影响，发现完全禁止捐款反而可能比设定非零上限导致更大的利益集团影响。
We analyze special interest influence on policy when political contributions are capped but the regulation contains soft‐money loopholes. The politician chooses between two policy options. We define special interest influence as the probability the politician chooses the policy he would not have chosen in the absence of contributions. Any binding cap reduces special interest influence but the effect may be nonmonotonic. A ban on contributions can result in greater special interest influence than a binding but nonzero cap. The results may also have implications for the policy response to the 2010 Supreme Court ruling on Citizens United v . FEC.