Why Do Controlling Families of Public Firms Sell Their Remaining Ownership Stake?
研究上市公司控股家族出售其剩余所有权股份的原因，发现最优风险承担、所有权与管理专长分离、CEO继任过程及外部大股东监督是主要解释因素，而时机解释仅得到微弱支持。
Abstract: I investigate what leads controlling families of publicly traded firms to sell their remaining ownership stake. The sale of a controlling stake is best explained in the context of theories of the firm related to optimal risk bearing, the separation of ownership and management expertise, the CEO succession process, and the monitoring provided by outside blockholders. A timing explanation is only marginally supported. The sale of a controlling stake is not explained by insufficient financial resources to fully invest in growth opportunities. This study offers insights into the final stage of the process in which entrepreneurs sequentially sell their firm to outside parties and also identifies the nature of costs of concentrated ownership.