Contractual and Organizational Structure with Reciprocal Agents
求解代理人具有互惠倾向时的最优契约，发现慷慨薪酬可替代绩效工资，并分析了企业采用互惠激励的条件，如产出难以衡量努力、代理人高互惠或高生产率等。
We solve for the optimal contract when agents are reciprocal, demonstrating that generous compensation can substitute for performance-based pay. Our results suggest several factors that make firms more likely to use reciprocal incentives. Reciprocity is most powerful when output is a poor signal of effort and when the agent is highly reciprocal and/or productive. Similarly, reciprocal incentives are attractive when firm managers have strong incentive pay and discretion over employee compensation. While reciprocal incentives can be optimal even when identical firms compete, a reciprocity contract is most likely when one firm has a match-specific productivity advantage with the agent.