The Role of Financial Institutions in the Corporate Governance of Listed Chinese Companies*
通过对金融机构高管和上市公司董事的访谈，发现中国金融机构在公司治理中作用有限，多数证券公司被动投资，部分主动基金协助公司财务预测、运营规范等，原因包括国有股权集中、监管不成熟等。
This paper explores the role of Chinese financial institutions in the corporate governance of listed companies through interviews with both senior managers of financial institutions and board directors of listed companies. Our results show that, while most securities companies are passive investors, a good proportion of the active mutual funds help their portfolio companies prepare financial forecasts, standardize their operations, raise external funds, strengthen their company image in the capital markets, and sometimes intervene in corporate issues. This limited role can be attributed to a number of factors specific to the Chinese context including highly concentrated state ownership, an immature regulatory environment, inadequate transparency and disclosure of financial information, and weak corporate governance within financial institutions themselves. It could also be affected by several other factors that are considered to cause institutional passivity in developed countries such as conflicts of interest, monitoring costs and lack of expertise.