Changes in Beef Packers' Market Power after the Livestock Mandatory Price Reporting Act: An Agent‐based Auction
利用基于主体的第一价格共同价值拍卖模型，研究了1999年《牲畜强制价格报告法案》对牛肉包装商市场势力的影响，发现该法案使饲养者受益，无论价格不确定性是否降低。
Controversy remains about the effectiveness of the 1999 Livestock Mandatory Price Reporting Act (MPRA). We determine the likely changes in beef packers' market power after the MPRA by using an agent‐based, first‐price common‐value auction. Past research has employed Cournot models, but we use an auction model, which more closely resembles the actual cattle procurement process. We find that feeders benefit from the MPRA regardless of whether price uncertainty decreases for packers and/or feeders. If the packers' price uncertainty is reduced, the feeder benefits from an increase in competition between the packers. If the feeder's price uncertainty is reduced, the feeder benefits from imposing more accurate reserve prices.