Marching to the Beat of Different Drummers: The Influence of Institutional Owners on Competitive Actions
研究发现，专注型机构投资者持股促进企业采取战略竞争行动，而短期交易型机构投资者持股则抑制战略行动、促进战术行动，两类投资者同时持股对两种行动均有影响。
This research extends agency theory by exploring the influence of varied, competing, principal interests on executive actions. Findings reveal that ownership of a firm by dedicated institutional investors, who hold concentrated portfolios over time, is positively associated with firm use of strategic competitive actions. Ownership by transient institutional investors, who hold broad portfolios and make frequent trades based on current earnings, is negatively associated with strategic competitive actions and positively associated with tactical ones. Appreciable ownership of the same firm by these two classes of investors influences both strategic and tactical competitive actions. These results have broad implications for executives, investors, and policy makers.