Robustly Optimal Monetary Policy with Near-Rational Expectations
研究央行在承认私人部门预期可能不完全符合模型时，如何选择稳健的最优货币政策，发现承诺仍重要、长期通胀目标不受信念扭曲影响、政策比理性预期假设下更依赖历史。
The paper considers optimal monetary stabilization policy in a forward-looking model, when the central bank recognizes that private sector expectations need not be precisely model-consistent, and wishes to choose a policy that will be as good as possible in the case of any beliefs that are close enough to model-consistency. It is found that commitment continues to be important for optimal policy, that the optimal long-run inflation target is unaffected by the degree of potential distortion of beliefs, and that optimal policy is even more history-dependent than if rational expectations are assumed.