China's land market auctions: evidence of corruption?
研究中国城市土地拍卖中，地方政府通过选择拍卖方式（英式或两阶段）和事前私下交易延续腐败，发现两阶段拍卖的成交价和竞争程度显著低于英式拍卖，且官员会将热门地块优先分配给两阶段拍卖。
In China, urban land is allocated by leasehold sales by local officials. Attempting to end widespread corruption, the government now requires sales to be conducted publicly, by either English or “two‐stage” auctions. However, corruption persists through the choice of auction format and preauction side deals between favored bidders and local officials. Two‐stage auctions have a first stage where favored developers signal that auctions are “taken,” deterring entry of other bidders. Empirics show that both sales prices and competition are significantly less for two‐stage than English auctions. Selection on unobserved property characteristics is positive: officials divert hotter properties to two‐stage auctions.