Why did the Elites Extend the Suffrage? Democracy and the Scope of Government, with an Application to Britain's "Age of Reform"
提出一个新解释：即使没有来自无选举权者的威胁，精英也可能主动扩大选举权，因为这能促使政治家从针对精英个人的再分配转向提供普惠利益的公共项目。作者用19世纪英国公共支出和政治竞争的演变来验证模型。
A new rationale is presented for why an elite may want to expand the franchise even in the absence of threats to the established order. Expanding the franchise can turn politicians away from particularistic politics based on ad personam redistribution within the elite and foster competition based on programs with diffuse benefits. If these programs are valuable, a majority of the elite votes in favor of an extension of the franchise despite the absence of a threat from the disenfranchised. We argue that the evolution of public spending and of political competition in nineteenth century Britain is consistent with our model.