Endogenous Leadership in a New Market
分析新市场中企业在不确定条件下的战略投资，面临承诺与灵活性的权衡。模型预测即使企业事前相同，也会出现非对称均衡：一家企业早期投资，另一家观望。市场盈利接近或低于预期时，企业规模不对称；市场高度盈利时，企业对称。不确定性小时，结果接近斯塔克尔伯格均衡。
In this article I analyze strategic investment under uncertainty in a new market, where firms face a tradeoff between commitment and flexibility. The model predicts asymmetric equilibria under fairly general conditions, even though firms are ex ante identical and have symmetric opportunities to enter the market. In equilibrium, one firm commits to early investment and the other firm follows a wait-and-see strategy. In the ex post outcome, firms end up with asymmetric sizes if the market profitability turns out close to, or lower than, expected; firms end up in symmetric position if the market turns out highly profitable. If uncertainty is small, the model yields (approximately) Stackelberg outcomes.