Optimal Taxation with Imperfect Competition and Aggregate Returns to Specialization
探讨在不完全竞争市场中，最优资本所得税应为负、企业利润税应没收的观点，并发现当生产率和企业数量内生时，最优财政政策取决于市场势力、专业化回报和政府控制进入的能力。
In this article we explore the proposition that, in economies with imperfect competitive markets, the optimal capital income tax is negative and the optimal tax on firms' profits is confiscatory. We show that if the total factor productivity as well as the number of firms or varieties are endogenous instead of fixed, then the optimal fiscal policy can lead to different results. The government faces a trade-off between the fixed costs that society pays for the introduction of a new firm and the productivity gains associated to the introduction of a new variety. We find that the optimal fiscal policy depends on the relationship between the index of market power, the returns to specialization, and the government's ability to control entry.