ENDOGENOUS PUNISHMENTS IN AGENCY WITH VERIFIABLE EX POST INFORMATION*
研究一个逆向选择模型，其中存在一个可验证但非完美的信号在事后揭示代理人类型。代理人受财富约束，最大惩罚取决于交易量。文章发现信号的性质与问题类型（买方或卖方）相关，且更多信息可能加剧信息不对称导致的扭曲，甚至增加代理人的信息租金。
The article studies an adverse selection model in which a contractible, imperfect signal on the agent's type is revealed ex post. The agent is wealth constrained, which implies that the maximum penalty depends on the contracted transaction (e.g., the volume of trade). First, we show that the qualitative effects of the signal can be unambiguously tied to the nature of the problem (e.g., whether the agent is in a “buyer” or a “seller” position). Second, the distortions caused by informational asymmetries may become more severe although more information is now available. Finally, the signal can actually serve to increase the agent's informational rents.