Dividend Policy and Cash‐Flow Uncertainty
从理论和实证两方面研究预期现金流波动如何影响股利政策，发现现金流不确定性越高的公司股利支付率越低，支持信息解释而非代理成本理论。
We explore the role of expected cash‐flow volatility as a determinant of dividend policy both theoretically and empirically. Our simple one‐period model demonstrates that, given the existence of a stock‐price penalty associated with dividend cuts, managers rationally pay out lower levels of dividends when future cash flows are less certain. The empirical results use a sample of REITs from 1985 to 1992 and confirm that payout ratios are lower for firms with higher expected cash‐flow volatility as measured by leverage, size and property‐level diversification. These results are consistent with information‐based explanations of dividend policy but not with agency‐cost theories.