Delegation and Incentive Compensation
基于零售银行分行经理数据，研究高层管理者如何同时决定授权程度和激励薪酬设计，发现高增长、波动大、创新多的银行授权更多，授权多的经理获得更多激励薪酬，但激励薪酬对授权程度无显著影响。
Top management faces two key organizational design choices: (1) how much authority to delegate to lower-level managers, and (2) how to design incentive compensation to ensure that these managers do not misuse their discretion. Theoretical accounting literature emphasizes that top management makes these two choices jointly, but there is little empirical evidence on this assertion. Capitalizing on a unique database of branch manager practices in retail banks, this study provides some of the first evidence on the joint nature of the delegation and incentive compensation choices for lower-level managers. A simultaneous model of these two choices indicates that high-growth, volatile, and innovative banks delegate more authority to branch managers. In turn, branch managers with more authority receive more incentive-based pay. However, in contrast with principal-agent theory, I find no evidence that the extent of incentive compensation plays a significant role in explaining the extent of delegation.