Legislative Representation, Bargaining Power and the Distribution of Federal Funds: Evidence from the US Congress
通过立法议价模型和实证分析，发现美国国会中代表权越高的地区获得的联邦资金越多，小州在参议院比在众议院获得更多资金，并验证了提案权和投票成本两个作用渠道。
This article investigates the relationship between representation in legislatures and the geographic distribution of federal funds. In a legislative bargaining model, we demonstrate that funds are concentrated in high representation areas, and two channels underlie this result. The proposal power channel reflects the role of representation in committee assignments, and the vote cost channel reflects the role of representation in coalition formation. In our empirical analysis, we find that small states, relative to large states, receive more funding in the US Senate, relative to the House. We also find empirical support for the two channels underlying this relationship. Copyright © The Author(s). Journal compilation © Royal Economic Society 2008.