Testing the Monopsony‐Inefficiency Incentive for Backward Integration
构建了一个可实证检验的模型，用于验证买方垄断导致的低效率是否会激励企业向后一体化，并以美国牛肉屠宰业为例，发现该激励确实存在。
Abstract In theory, monopsony at one stage in a vertically related market provides an incentive for backward integration into the adjacent competitive stages. By integrating backward, a monopsonist internalizes the monopsony inefficiency due to underemployment of the factor produced upstream. However, little is known about the importance of such incentive in practice. In this paper I provide an empirically implementable model to test the monopsony‐inefficiency incentive for vertical integration. For illustration, the model is applied to the U.S. beef slaughter industry. Findings seem to support the monopsony‐inefficiency incentive for backward integration by the industry into the live cattle market.