Incomplete Information Bargaining with Outside Opportunities
研究卖方在不确定买方估值时，因随时间变得悲观而可能转向外部机会（卖给其他买家或自用），这导致谈判期限有限，并产生多重均衡。
We consider two kinds of ‘outside opportunity’ that a seller of an indivisible good might have: selling to a different buyer and consuming the good herself. In both models the seller is uncertain about the buyer's valuation, and becomes more pessimistic over time. When the seller becomes sufficiently pessimistic, she prefers the outside opportunity, so she will not bargain indefinitely with the current buyer. Despite the resulting finite-horizon nature of negotiations, the link between the buyer's willingness to accept an offer and the seller's eagerness to go "outside" generates multiple equilibria.